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INTRODUCTION
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States.'
In responding to attacks on his handling of the broadly defined war on
terror, President George W. Bush declared, "As President and Commander-
in-Chief, I have the constitutional responsibility and the constitutional au-
thority to protect our country. Article II of the Constitution gives me that
responsibility and the authority necessary to fulfill it."2 Days later, the Ad-
ministration again invoked commander-in-chief powers upon signing a
congressional measure to ban torture, warning that "the executive branch
shall construe the section in a manner consistent with the President's consti-
tutional authority as Commander in Chief' and adding that "situations may
arise, especially in wartime, in which the President must act promptly under
his constitutional grants of executive power and authority as Commander in
Chief."3 VThat exactly are these commander-in-chief powers to which the
President repeatedly refers?
In interpreting constitutional questions such as these, the Bush Admini-
stration ardently advocates an originalist approach. In deciding upon the
nominations of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, Bush
"pledged to make 'original meaning'4 appointments in the mold of Justices
Scalia and Thomas."' Indicative of the Administration's views, Professor
John Yoo, a former attorney in the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel under the Bush Administration, has argued for broad presidential
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
2. Press Release, The White House (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/12/20051219-2.html.
3. President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863 (Dec. 30, 2005), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/2005123o-8.html.
4. This Note focuses on original intent because most information available is on
the Framers' understanding; however, for the purposes of this study, the
terms "original intent" and "original meaning" may potentially be used al-
most interchangeably, since the Framers and public alike saw Washington as
the personification of the American cause and certain to be the first president.
Likewise, many of Washington's actions during the Revolutionary War were
well known to the white male voters, as many had served under him in the
Revolution and newspapers also reported heavily upon his activities. For fur-
ther discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 119-23. For further discus-
sion on original intent and original meaning, see, for example, ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990).
5. Bruce Fein, Electing the Supreme Court, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, at A16.
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war-making powers using an originalist approach.6 This preoccupation with
the historical understanding of constitutional mandates is not confined to
the executive branch. Even prior to Bush's appointments to the bench, Su-
preme Court decisions in a series of recent separation of powers cases "indi-
cate[d] that a majority believe[d] history to be relevant, if not decisive, on
questions of constitutional structure," and some justices treat historical
evidence as dispositive in interpreting the Constitution.7 Even those critical
of expansive executive power, such as Dean Harold Koh, and Professors
Michael Glennon and Louis Henkin, employ original intent arguments.8
Both sides of the spectrum agree that "triangulating from the wisdom of the
past to the ... circumstances of the present is at least the default point of
departure .... The alternative to that is chaos."9 Indeed, "[b]oth the Su-
preme Court and leading academics have come to accept that evidence of
the original understanding of the Constitution is relevant to any discussion
of the document's meaning."'" It is not the purpose of this Note to rehash
the debate over the importance of original intent. This study instead as-
sumes that the Framers' understanding is at least a consideration in inter-
preting the Constitution.1' Accordingly, this Note seeks to use the lens of
6. See generally JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITU-
TION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005) [hereinafter Yoo, WAR AND
PEACE]; John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo,
Continuation of Politics].
7. Yoo, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 6, at 25; see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 944 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting); United States Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 802-15 (1995); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Consti-
tution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1982 (1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court's renewed interest
in the structural elements of the Constitution has relied in part upon the
original understanding.").
8. See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990);
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1996); HAR-
OLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990).
9. C-Span Weekend, (C-Span television broadcast Mar. 19, 2006) (comments of
William Galston, Former Deputy Domestic Policy Advisor to President Clin-
ton from 1993-95).
10. Yoo, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 6, at 25.
11. See Martin S. Flaherty, Symposium, More Apparent Than Real: The Revolu-
tionary Commitment to Constitutional Federalism, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 993,
lOO6 (1997) ("Even for non-originalists, the Founders' unparalleled experience
in applied constitutional thought, along with their not inconsiderable acu-
men, gives their views a certain persuasive, perhaps even presumptive, au-
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original intent to examine the meaning of Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of
the United States Constitution 2 based upon the actions of the only com-
mander in chief to lead the fledgling United States of 1787: General George
Washington.
General Washington "was obliged.., to teach Congress how to govern
a nation at war."' 3 With his numerous communications as commander in
chief and statesman, Washington kept the Framers well informed of his
actions throughout the Revolution. " In doing so, he also communicated his
understanding of the role of the American commander in chief.' This Note
contends that the Framers' understanding of the term "commander in
chief" was shaped by their experiences with Washington. 16 As a result, in
thority."); see also William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 859 (1995).
12. See supra note i.
13. 1 HENRY CABOT LODGE, GEORGE WASHINGTON 170 (1898 ed.).
14. This study draws heavily upon primary sources from the period in addition to
secondary academic interpretation, a widely sanctioned approach to interpre-
tation. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Response: History Right?: Historical Schol-
arship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2101 (1999) ("[Hlistorical interpretation that relies ex-
tensively on primary sources [and] demonstrates a command of the secon-
dary literature.., should, and on reflection does, command greater re-
spect.").
15. See 1 LODGE, supra note 13, at 166 ("In the hours 'allotted to sleep,' [General
Washington] sat in his headquarters, writing a letter, with 'blots and
scratches,' which told Congress with the utmost precision and vigor just what
was needed [to conduct a war.] The task of facing and fighting the enemy was
enough for the ablest of men; but Washington was obliged also to combat and
overcome the inertness and dullness born of ignorance, and to teach Congress
how to govern a nation at war.").
16. Many legal scholars agree with the key assertion that Washington shaped the
Framers' conception of the executive's powers. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 135 (2005); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 64-67 (1913); Steven G. Calabresi, The
President, the Supreme Court, and the Founding Fathers: A Reply to Professor
Ackerman, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 481 (2006) ("[The Framers'] immediate
role model for [President] was, of course, George Washington, who everyone
knew would be the first president. The presidential office was designed with
him in mind, and he in turn further defined the office by the precedents he
set."); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the
Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 509-10 (1988); Gordon Wood,
President George Washington, Republican Monarch 9 (Princeton University,
James Madison Leadership Conference Paper, Feb. 2004), available at
http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/calendar/conferences/Washington%
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writing Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, the Framers' concept of the powers the
clause encompassed was based upon the Washington model. 7 Therefore,
this model characterizes original intent for the powers of the American
commander in chief.
This framework produces provocative conclusions about the war pow-
ers of the modern presidency. The Washington model provides original
intent evidence for" (1) the President's power under the Commander-in-
2oGordon%2oWood.pdf ("[T]he Convention had.., gone on to make the
new chief executive so strong, so king-like, precisely because the delegates ex-
pected George Washington to be the first president."). See generally H. JEF-
FERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN
ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2002). See also primary
sources, including Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, in 3 THE RE-
CORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302 (Max Farrand ed., 1966),
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field
(DOCID+@lit(froo322o)). Washington himself saw his actions as precedent-
setting. See Letter from George Washington to James Madison (May 5, 1789),
in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 310-11 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
George Washington Bicentennial Commission 1976) (1932).
17. At the start of the war, the Framers were indeed influenced by English history
and political theorists John Locke, William Blackstone, and Montesquieu.
John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation: Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star
Wars and the End of the Cold War, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 883-84; John C. Yoo,
Note, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation,
101 YALE L.J. 1607, 16o9-10 (1992). This Note does not contend that this politi-
cal theory was irrelevant. Instead, this Note asserts that the Washington
model is an adaptation of these theories, as they were distilled through the
Framers' firsthand, practical experience with Washington during the Revolu-
tion. See Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2112 ("More important in any case was the
Founders' own experience."). See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH
OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89 (1st ed. 1956). As discussed infra, having rejected
the British Model, the Founders were seeking to create their own government.
They tested their notions throughout the war and developed an understand-
ing of those powers necessary for the Republic to grant the commander in
chief in light of the practical realities of the Revolution. They supported and
sanctioned the nearly deified Washington's exertion of power and, when
drafting the Constitution, "cast their eyes towards General Washington as
President; and shaped their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by
their opinions of his Virtue." Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, su-
pra note 16. For this reason, the Washington model holds great weight for the
original intent (and meaning) of the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
18. This Note does not seek to address the power of the commander in chief to
initiate hostilities, as they had commenced prior to Washington's relevant ac-
tions.
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Chief Clause to refrain from ex ante congressional consultation regarding
strategic military actions after initiation of hostilities; and (2) the President's
duty to:' 9 (A) keep Congress informed of his wartime actions whenever pos-
sible, (B) always defer to Congress when taking custody of non-enlisted
American citizens, and (c) to refrain from attempting to infringe upon
Congress's Takings power without explicit congressional authorization.2"
The ambitious range of the issues addressed by this Note is permitted by
its narrow focus. Each of these issues is addressed from a purely originalist
perspective. This Note restricts its scope to the evaluation of modern presi-
dential powers under the Commander-in-Chief Clause based upon Wash-
ington's Revolutionary War precedent.2' It examines what Washington's
war actions and writings imply for modern presidential war power. The
weight that should be afforded to the conclusions of this Note depends
upon each reader's subjective convictions regarding the importance of
original intent. It is important to note that this study does not take into
account the political, moral or other considerations that may be necessary in
fully evaluating some of these controversial issues.
Part I begins by establishing Washington as the Constitution's model
commander in chief. This Note then analyzes the consequences of this
model for our contemporary understanding of commander-in-chief pow-
ers. While many scholars espouse the importance of original intent in their
arguments and many others point to Washington as the model,22 current
literature does not connect the two concepts in a comprehensive analysis.2
19. This Note only considers those powers inherent in the original intent of the
Commander-in-Chief Clause. Because Washington possessed only com-
mander-in-chief-and not executive-powers during the Revolution, it is be-
yond the scope of this Note to address whether the President has these limita-
tions under the President's "general residuum of 'executive Power'... above
and beyond" Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. AMAR, supra note
16, at 185. This is further discussed infra note 137.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
21. As this Note focuses purely on original intent evidence, it is beyond its scope
to address subsequent legislation and treaties. Likewise, this Note does not
seek to attend to modern moral and political arguments surrounding these is-
sues. It is not the purpose of this Note to attend to each nuance of present de-
bate.
22. See supra note 16 (citing works that back this assertion).
23. To date, "[flor all its scavenging tendencies, the legal community has yet to
consider this body of scholarship and relate it to modern federalism contro-
versies. Even worse, legal professionals generally have failed to make any
credible historical assertions about federalism, whether about the American
Revolution or the Founding itself." Flaherty, supra note ii, at 995 (internal ci-
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Indeed, there is a surprising dearth of scholarship regarding the implications
of a Washington model for presidential powers. This Note advances our
understanding of the original intent of Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 by scru-
tinizing Washington's actions as commander in chief of the Continental
Army. Part II provides the context of Washington's actions within the
broader scope of the Revolutionary War and demonstrates their significance
for the period. Part III delves into the specific events of the Revolutionary
War most pertinent in analyzing the Washington model's implications for
the modern presidency. This approach reveals striking and controversial
conclusions in Part IV regarding the war-making powers of the presidency.
I. THE MODEL COMMANDER: GEORGE III vs. GEORGE WASHINGTON
Were the Framers basing their understanding of "commander in chief'
upon the model against which they were rebelling (the monarchical gov-
ernment of King George III) or were they developing their own understand-
ing of the phrase based upon their experiences with the Commander in
Chief of their own forces? This Part contends that the Framers were forming
their own notions alongside their own form of government.24 It begins by
discrediting the use of the George III model and concludes by reinforcing
the validity of the Washington model.
A. Modeled After George III?
John Yoo, while an attorney in the Justice Department, advised the
White House that it was crucial to centralize authority in the executive re-
garding matters of national defense and foreign policy.2" He justified his
tations omitted). See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch,
105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (discussing the proper historical methods for analyz-
ing the Framers' conceptions of separation of powers); Martin S. Flaherty,
History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523
(1995) ("[Historical scholarship] now provides unprecedented opportunities
for informing our constitutional present with our constitutional past. Such, at
any rate, is the case with the Founding and, no less important, the develop-
ments that led to it.").
24. See MORGAN, supra note 17, at 135 (noting that the Convention succeeded "not
simply because the members possessed a common economic of class interest
but because they held common principles, principles learned in twenty years
of British tyranny and American seeking").
25. Memorandum from John Yoo to Timothy Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the
President, The President's Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military Op-
erations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm. ("The centralization of author-
ity in the president alone is particularly crucial in matters of national defense,
war and foreign policy, where a unitary executive can evaluate threats, con-
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view of a powerful executive using an originalist approach. In The Powers of
War and Peace, Yoo cites the powers of the British monarch2 6 (who, at the
time of the Revolution, had been King George III for the last generation) as
the Framers' understanding of the executive and suggests "that the Framers
did not wish to alter the constitutional authorities" known while under the
British Crown. 27 "Although they threw off the weight of British political
control, the Framers did not reject immediately the British system of gov-
ernment. '2 Citing backing from William C. Banks and Peter Raven-
Hansen, he contends "[t] he Constitution's provisions did not break with the
tradition of their English, state, and revolutionary predecessors, but instead
followed in their footsteps. ' 29 Yoo has argued that, in creating the federal
sider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and energy
that is far superior to any other branch.").
26. It is not the purpose of this Note to rehash the George III Model but instead
to focus on the model contended to be the relevant one: the Washington
model. For a discussion on the King's commander-in-chief powers, see WIL-
LIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *249-62; see also WALTER BAGEHOT,
THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 21-96, 120-49 (Oxford Univ. Press 1963 ed.)
(1915).
27. Yoo, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 6, at 63 (arguing that the state constitu-
tions, often based upon the British system, served as a model regarding alloca-
tion of authorities). Yoo also discusses the British model in Yoo, Continuation
of Politics, supra note 6, and John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in
the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1191-222 (focusing on the
British model for the Declare War Clause). But see GORDON S. WOOD, CREA-
TION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2d ed. 1998) ("[The resulting Constitu-
tion], clear to many Americans by 1790, was a truly original formulation of
political assumptions and the creation of a distinctly American system of poli-
tics."); Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1637
(2000) (noting the Framers "specifically rejected the British model"); ERNEST
R. MAY, The President Shall Be Commander in Chief, in THE ULTIMATE DECI-
SION 8 (Ernest May ed., 196o) ("Memories of the Revolution certainly influ-
enced the generation of 1787. So did the fact that the former commander in
chief was expected to be the first president .... [M]ost men were visualizing
Washington not only in his old post but also in the new one.... Respect for
Washington's political as well as military capabilities thus had something to
do with the framing of the commander-in-chief clause."); supra note 16 (cit-
ing works that counter Yoo's assertion).
28. Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 6, at 197.
29. Id. (citing WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1994)); see also John C. Yoo, War Pow-
ers: War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1649 (2002)
("During the ratifying conventions, ... the Framers... understood the allo-
cation of the war power between the President and Congress against the his-
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democracy, "Madison drew upon British history... [of] the crown's control
over the use of military force"3" since "the revolutionaries [had] decided to
mimic the British forms of government." 3 Arguing that even "Anti-
Federalists did not disagree about the workings of the British system," he
concluded that the Framers believed that "the warmaking relationship be-
tween President and Congress would operate just as did the one between
Crown and Parliament."32
Although Yoo concedes some possible innovation from the British
model,33 he nevertheless espouses the importance of looking to the Crown
in assessing Executive war power since "the war powers provisions of the
Constitution are best understood as an adoption, rather than a rejection, of
the traditional British approach to war powers."34 He argues for broad
presidential war powers on the basis that the British King had such broad
powers and the Framers' original "intent [was] to continue the general Brit-
ish patterns."35 He contends that because the King was the "generalissimo,
or the first in military command, within the kingdom,"36 so was the design
of the American executive since "[i] n adopting a new Constitution, the Fra-
mers consciously acted in the context of the British Constitution. " "
The Supreme Court has challenged this approach, insisting,
there is such a wide difference between the power conferred on the
President of the United States, and the authority and sovereignty
which belong to the English crown, that it would be altogether
unsafe to reason from any supposed resemblance between them ...
torical baseline established by the struggle between the Crown and Parlia-
ment.").
30. John C. Yoo & Neil J. Kinkopf, What Are the Limits of Presidential Power?,
LEGAL AFF., Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debate
club-presidentialpowerllo5.msp.
31. Yoo, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 6, at 65.
32. Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 29, at 1658-59.
33. "The Framers were influenced not only by the theory and practice of British
war-making, but also by their own experiences with American government
prior to 1787." Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 6, at 218.
34. Id. at 242.
35. Yoo, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 6, at 66 (discussing state constitutions,
which were used in drafting the Federal Constitution). But see Louise Burn-
ham Dunbar, A Study of "Monarchical" Tendencies in the United States from
1776 to 18oi, lo U. ILL. STUD. SOC. SCI. 1, 27-75 (1923).
36. Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra note 6, at 203 (quoting WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *254) .
37. Id. at 197.
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[regarding any] subject where the rights and powers of the executive
arm of the government are brought into question. Our own
Constitution and form of government must be our only guide.3"
This Note finds evidence to support such criticisms of Yoo's premise; how-
ever, using the more firmly grounded Washington model, it nevertheless
finds justification for broad executive authority over non-citizens.39 In ef-
fect, this study uncovers evidence to reject Yoo's argumentation while nev-
ertheless supporting some of his conclusions via an alternative approach.
B. Rejecting George III
"[Yoo's] account is at odds with the ample evidence that the Founders
decided quite deliberately to change the British system."4" After fighting a
long and bitter war to rid themselves of the British monarchy, the Ameri-
cans turned, in the Constitutional Convention, to creating a radically new
federal government defined by separation of powers. The Framers felt the
"need to institutionalize American experience under the exigencies of a
revolutionary situation ...The result[ing Constitution], clear to many
Americans by 1790, was a truly original formulation of political assumptions
38. Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 618 (1850). This sentiment is echoed in current
debate, where it is still frequently contended that to "argue that the American
concept of executive war powers was formed largely by the British experience,
despite the historical fact that the colonies' revolt from Britain was partly a re-
action to the Crown's excessive executive power" is incorrect. Mark R. Shul-
man & Lawrence J. Lee, The Debate Over War Powers, 30 HUM. RTS. 6, 6
(Winter 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/wintero3/debateover
war.html; see also Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2107 ("Whether the Founders
did-or we should-view the President and Senate as presenting the same
need for a popular check as a 'Prince' is not the open-and-shut case that Yoo
implies."); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers To-
day: Why Methodology Matters, lo6 YALE L.J. 845, 845 (1996) (reviewing Louis
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)) ("While Yoo is right to emphasize
the importance of Congress's power of the purse as its most powerful tool in
restraining executive military action, his account is at odds with the ample
evidence that the Founders decided quite deliberately to change the British
system.").
39. Yoo does mention Washington's influence but focuses on the Crown as the
Framers' model for executive war power. Yoo, Continuation of Politics, supra
note 6, at 252 (agreeing that the "paternal vision of the President was consis-
tent with the Framers' knowledge that the office would be held first by George
Washington" but nevertheless focusing on the premise that "Americans of the
Framers' generation would have widely understood the commander-in-chief
power as a continuation of the English and colonial tradition in war powers").
40. Stromseth, supra note 38, at 961.
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and the creation of a distinctly American system of politics."'" Throughout
the Convention, "[dioubtless most Founders looked forward to the leader-
ship of George Washington."42 This Part contends that the Framers rejected
the George III Model and instead understood their future leader's actions in
the Revolutionary War to be the model for the President's commander-in-
chief powers.
1. The War Years: Evolving Understanding
While the Crown's use of commander-in-chief powers43 certainly influ-
enced the Continental Congress's initial understanding of the phrase,4 4 they
did not seek to maintain the status quo. "More important in any case was
the Founders' own experience ' '4' and, throughout the war, they experi-
mented with defining the powers of the American Commander. 46 The rebel-
ling colonists' opposition to the monarchy's commander-in-chief powers is
reflected at the outset in The Declaration of Independence, in which they
charge:
[King George III] has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing
Armies without the Consent of our legislatures. He has affected to
render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign
to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his
Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For quartering large
bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock
Trial from punishment for any Murders which they should commit
47on the Inhabitants of these States ....
41. Wood, supra note 27, at ix.
42. AMAR, supra note 16, at 197.
43. See generally 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *249-62.
44. Hamilton compared (and contrasted) the President with the Crown. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
45. Flaherty, supra note 14, at 2112. The constitutional principles developed by the
Framers were not abstract doctrines of political theory but rather developed
out of the immediate needs and experiences during the Revolution. See gener-
ally MORGAN, supra note 17, at 62-87 (describing the various crises that arose
leading up to, and during, the Revolution and how the Americans adapted to
them); id. at 88-112 (describing the uniquely American issues that arose as the
Framers were attempting to create a new government).
46. See infra Part II.
47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13-17 (U.S. 1776).
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This suggests that the colonists were not "in acceptance of the British ap-
proach" to government, as Yoo infers." On the contrary, they deeply feared
that the perceived failings of the British system would re-emerge under their
new government.
49
The colonists' wariness of duplicating George III's power over the mili-
tary is, unsurprisingly, reflected in the Articles of Confederation. At the
outset of war, in addition to appointing all U.S. officers of the land forces,5"
"[t]he Congress had the 'sole and exclusive right and power' to make rules
for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to di-
rect their operations."" Even after the Continental Army was in the field,
Congress initially retained principal responsibility for the supply and ad-
ministration of the troops. "Whatever executive and legislative power over
the armed forces existed was vested in the Continental Congress." 2 Break-
ing with the British concept of a commander in chief in the likeness of King
George III, the Second Continental Congress initially directly managed mo-
bilization, military strategy, and even tactics via subcommittees.53 "Lacking
a central executive, the Congress relied on various boards and committees
to perform its executive functions."5 4 In a deliberate move away from the
British system, the American system served as "the very antithesis of the idea
of vesting the power of war and peace in [an] executive['s] hands."55 Con-
gress toiled with its own vision of a commander in chief, commencing the
war with a weak one. Initially "[i] nspired by fear of seizure of political con-
trol by military leaders, Congress kept a suspiciously watchful eye on the
48. YOO, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 6, at 65.
49. Bennet N. Hollander, The President and Congress-Operational Control of the
Armed Forces, 27 MIL. L. REV. 49, 50 (1965) (noting that the "colonists shared
a deep fear of the development under the new government of a military
branch unchecked by the legislature and susceptible to use by an arbitrary ex-
ecutive power").
50. Congress retained appointment authority over regimental officers. Id. at 51.
51. Id. (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX (1781)).
52. Id. at 53.
53. JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 6 (1935). For further discussion on the
Board of War's development, see the first chapter of Sanders's book.
54. Hollander, supra note 49, at 53.
55. Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The
Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 568
(1974) (regarding the original intent of the President's foreign policy powers);
see Yoo, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 6; Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution,
supra note 7, at 2009 n.252.
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military force and its commanders," 6 only gradually granting Washington
power as they learned from the realities of war."
These actions demonstrate a conscious and determined shift from the
British model. With such deeds, the colonists were by no means attempting
to recreate a commander in chief in the model of King George III. Rather
than mimicking what they saw as the British monarchy's "illegal and void"
commander-in-chief orders, 8 the Framers came to find their model in the
man they commended to "have conducted the great military contest with
wisdom and fortitude invariably regarding the rights of the civil power
through all disasters and changes."59 Throughout the Revolution, the Fram-
ers were developing their own concept of commander in chief based upon
their experience with the beloved commander of their forces: George Wash-
ington.6" Having determinedly rejected the British monarchical notion of
the commander in chief,6 it is this tried and tested notion of commander in
chief that the Founders brought with them to the Constitutional Conven-
tion.
2. Framing the Constitution
Four years after Washington's famous surrender of power to Congress
in 1783, he was asked to attend the Constitutional Convention in Philadel-
phia. At this point, Washington was "held in awe by the delegates and al-
ready the de facto leader of the country."62 As it was becoming evident that
the Articles of Confederation were not a viable form of government, the
delegates sought to amend the republic according to what they had learned
56. Hollander, supra note 49, at 53 (internal citation omitted).
57. See infra Part II.
58. "The orders aforesaid for rendering the authority of the Commander-in-
chief, and under him, of the Brigadiers-General, supreme, are illegal and
void." I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 69 (Oct. 14,
1774) (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds., 1904-37) .
59. The Continental Congress's Answer to George Washington's Resignation
Address, in 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra
note 58, at 838 (Dec. 23, 1783), available at http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/
documents/revolution/congress.html.
60. Washington was so beloved that "it was widely thought that Washington
could have become king or dictator [but] he wanted nothing of the kind."
Wood, supra note 16, at 3.
61. Likewise, after the Revolution "the state constitutions reflected a sharp break
from the royal prerogative model." Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty,
Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 584
(2004).
62. Rotunda, supra note 16, at 51o.
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from the "grand experiment" thus far. In creating the executive branch,
"[als Americans in 1787 tried to envision a republican head of state who
could protect them against old King George without becoming a new King
George, they did have a particular George in mind.
63
Senator William Maclay, a delegate from Pennsylvania, noted the inten-
tions of the Framers and the American people. Quite far from looking to
duplicate George III, Maclay noted, "[w]e have lately had a hard struggle for
our liberty against kingly authority [and] everything related to that species
of government is odious to the people."' English history had taught the
Framers that danger lurked in vesting command in a system like the British
government.6 Likewise, in the debates, "Federalists such as Tench Coxe,
Noah Webster, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney contrasted America's
former experience under the English Constitution with its prospective ex-
perience under the proposed Constitution."66 Indeed, Delegate John Wilson
noted that he "did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a
proper guide in defining the Executive powers." 67 Instead, they looked to
the man whom Maclay described as "the greatest man in the world. '68 Cer-
tainly, "[e]veryone at Philadelphia ... understood, as did later ratifiers, that
Washington would likely serve as America's first president... [and] were
consciously or subconsciously influenced by the fact that George Washing-
ton was the presiding officer-the unanimously chosen 'president'-of the
Philadelphia Convention itself."69
While Article II, Section 2, infused the presidency with the power to act
decisively, "America's president would wield a less threatening kind of ex-
63. AMAR, supra note 16, at 131.
64. JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM PENNSYL-
VANIA, 1789-1791, at lo (Edgar S. Maclay ed., 1st ed. 189o); see also Flaherty, su-
pra note 14, at 2125 ("Constitutionally-minded Americans... necessarily
abandoned the dominant English mixed-government conceptions.").
65. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., 1 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 459 (Edward S.
Cowin ed., 2006).
66. Flaherty, supra note 11, at 1007.
67. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 16, at 65;
see Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffer-
sonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1654 (2005).
68. JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, supra note 64, at 248.
69. AMAR, supra note 16, at 134-35 ("[H]is presence filled the room" in which the
Convention was held); see also FARRAND, supra note 16, at 58 ("His presence
in the convention was felt to be essential to the success of its work."); Ro-
tunda, supra note 16, at 5o9-51o; Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler,
supra note 16.
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ecutive power than Britain's king."7 In defining the powers of the President,
the Framers appealed to their memories of the "situation during the late
war, and... recollection of the appointment of the Commander in Chief."'"
Indeed, "[m]emories of the Revolution certainly influenced the generation
of 1787. So did the fact that the former commander in chief was expected to
be the first president."72 Senator Pierce Butler, a delegate from South Caro-
lina, confirmed how central Washington was to the Framers' understanding
of the American commander in chief, writing that the presidential powers
were
greater than I was disposed to make them. Nor, Entre Nous, do I
believe they would have been so great had not many of the members
cast their eyes towards General Washington as President; and shaped
their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by their opinions of
his Virtue.73
Throughout the Revolution and Constitutional Convention it is clear
that the Framers actively sought to break with the precedent of the King"
and follow the model of the beloved man who was key to both winning the
war and ratifying the Constitution. Indeed, "[the Framers'] immediate role
model for [President] was, of course, George Washington, who everyone
knew would be the first president. The presidential office was designed with
him in mind."75
70. AMAR, supra note 16, at 187-88. The Framers learned during the Revolution
that "the absence of a strongly unified military-command structure had in-
deed compromised America's military effectiveness" during the first years.
AMAR, supra note 38, at 142. Some derided the proposal of a three-man Presi-
dency as "extremely inconvenient," as the Framers did not want "a general
with three heads." I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, su-
pra note 16, at 97. Reminiscent of their generous grant of power to Washing-
ton prior to their fleeing Philadelphia, they provided for a unitary President
with a "supple textual mandate to act in various situations that might be im-
possible to define in advance." AMAR, supra note 16, at 186.
71. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION Or 1787
(Galland Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 2007).
72. MAY, supra note 27, at 7.
73. Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler, supra note 16, at 302 (emphasis
added).
74. Responding to attacks that the new federal government would return the
country to a system similar to that under the British, Hamilton repeatedly
disclaimed the British Crown as a model for the president. See, e.g., THE FED-
ERALIST Nos. 67-77 (Alexander Hamilton).
75. Calabresi, supra note 16, at 481.
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What precedents did Washington set as he conducted the war? Part II
provides an overview of Washington's actions throughout the Revolution-
ary War while focusing on those specific events most pertinent to modern
debate.
II. THE WASHINGTON MODEL: THE CONTEXT OF WASHINGTON'S ACTIONS
Although Americans understood the Commander in Chief's authority
in wartime to be quite limited by Congress at the commencement of the
Revolution, as the war waged on, the unsuitability of this setup became
painfully apparent. Both Washington and Congress saw the necessity of
granting the executive broader authority to strategize and wage the war. As
Washington was able to use his expanded commander-in-chief powers to
help turn the tide, the people readily approved of this latter model. This Part
delves into the history of this transformation of the American understand-
ing of their Commander in Chief.
A. Rule by Committee: A Weak Commander
In June 1775, there had been no declaration of war by the fifty-six mem-
bers of the Continental Congress nor was there an official American army
when Congress unanimously voted to name George Washington as their
commander in chief.76 Armed hostilities had commenced in April 1775 at
76. Congress resolved:
We, reposing special trust and confidence in your patriotism,
valor, conduct, and fidelity, do, by these presents, constitute and ap-
point you to be General and Commander in chief, of the army of the
United Colonies, and of all the forces now raised, or to be raised, by
them, and of all others who shall voluntarily offer their service, and
join the said Army for the Defense of American liberty, and for re-
pelling every hostile invasion thereof: And you are hereby vested
with full power and authority to act as you shall think for the good
and welfare of the service.
And we do hereby strictly charge and require all Officers and
Soldiers, under your command, to be obedient to your orders, and
diligent in the exercise of their several duties.
And we do also enjoin and require you, to be careful in execut-
ing the great trust reposed in you, by causing strict discipline and or-
der to be observed in the army, and that the soldiers be duly exer-
cised, and provided with all convenient necessaries.
And you are to regulate your conduct in every respect by the
rules and discipline of war, (as herewith given you,) and punctually
to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time,
as you shall receive from this, or a future Congress of these United
Colonies, or committee of Congress.
2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 58, at 96
(June 17, 1775).
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Lexington, Massachusetts when a column of British regulars confronted a
group of militia on Lexington Green. After years of smoldering discord be-
tween the government of George III and the American "rabble in arms," the
shooting had begun." By the time George Washington arrived to assume his
command in July 1775, the British Army had been driven into Boston and
was held in siege by twenty thousand American militiamen.
At the time, Washington had been retired from military life for fifteen
years. His only military experience had been in backwoods warfare and he
had done poorly by most standards. He had never commanded anything
larger than a regiment, let alone led an army, in battle. Nevertheless, Benja-
min Rush observed that Washington had "so much martial dignity in his
deportment that you would distinguish him to be a general and soldier from
among ten thousand people."78 Referred to as "His Excellency," Washington
was tremendously respected by Congress and the citizenry alike. In fact, he
was seen by many recruits as the main inspiration for joining the American
cause. Washington personified the Revolution and was pivotal in gaining
public support for the war.
In this context of overwhelming support, Washington could have
wielded great power from the start, had he wished. However, while en-
trusted with the title of commander in chief, Washington accepted the fact
that he was the servant of the fifty-six delegates of Congress. He had served
in the Congress and knew how it operated. In an example of Congress' ini-
tial attempt to democratize command, Washington was required by Con-
gress to consult a Council of War concerning any military action of conse-
quence,79 and at the start of the war, Washington "believ[ed] that he was
77. 1 SIR GEORGE OTTO TREVELYAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 298 (1926).
78. Letter from Benjamin Rush to Thomas Rushton (Oct. 29, 1775), in LETTERS OF
BENJAMIN RUSH 92 (L.H. Butterfield ed., Am. Philosophical Soc'y 1951).
79. Congress resolved:
And whereas all particulars cannot be foreseen, nor positive in-
structions for such emergencies so before hand given but that many
things must be left to your prudent and discreet management, as oc-
currences may arise upon the place, or from time to time fall out,
you are therefore upon all such accidents or any occasions that may
happen, to use your best circumspection and (advising with your
council of war) to order and dispose of the said Army under your
command as may be most advantageous for the obtaining the end
for which these forces have been raised, making it your special care
in discharge of the great trust committed unto you, that the liberties
of America receive no detriment.
2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 58, at lol
(June 20, 1775) (emphasis added). Washington's Council was not an arm of
Congress but a group of generals that Congress nevertheless obliged him to
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
bound by congressional instruction not to act without the[irl approval.""
Congress was wary of giving one military commander too much power.
Therefore, at its commencement, the war was intended to be micromanaged
by committees, with Congress having the final say in matters concerning
mobilization, appointment of officers, and military strategy."1
With the American militiamen blocking the land escape routes, the ap-
proximately eight thousand men of the British Army were trapped in Bos-
ton. The only means to break out of the trap was by sea. Washington saw
this as an opportunity to end the conflict, at least temporarily, by attacking
and defeating the British in Boston before a sea evacuation could be accom-
plished or reinforcements from Britain arrived. He understood a strike on
Boston could mean the destruction of the town, but standing and waiting
was not the way to win a war in Washington's opinion. At this point in the
war, however, the decision was not his alone to make. Expressing his frus-
tration with waging the war via committee, he wrote to his brother John,
"the inactive state we lye in is exceedingly disagreeable." 2 Washington
wanted a "speedy finish," 3 so in September 1775 he called a meeting of the
Council of War, questioning "to know whether in [their] judgments [the
Continental Army] cannot make a successful attack upon the troops in Bos-
ton, by means of Boats."8 4
Washington's request to attack was declined by the Council as too risky.
Although Major General Charles Lee was the only professional soldier on
the Council," Washington, cognizant of his role as a republican com-
mander, nevertheless followed the decision of the largely inexperienced
consult. Their power to block Washington's action is discussed in the follow-
ing paragraph.
80. ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
309 (2005).
81. "The Congress had the 'sole and exclusive right and power' to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to direct
their operations." Hollander, supra note 49, at 50 (quoting ARTICLES OF CON-
FEDERATION art. IX (1781)); see also SANDERS, supra note 53, at 6. This concept
evolved throughout the war.
82. Letter from George Washington to John Washington (Sept. 1O, 1775), in 2
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 447 (W.W. Abbot, Dorothy Twohig & Phi-
lander D. Chase eds., 1983).
83. Circular to the General Officers (Sept. 8, 1775), in 2 PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 82, at 433.
84. Id. at 432.
85. Lee, as a former British Officer, was the only member of the counsel with
formal military training. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776, at 51 (2005).
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men.86 However, he continued the construction of the flat bottom boats,
which he had planned to use in the attack. Between March 1775 and March
1776, Washington asked four times to attack Boston but the action was
voted down each time." On March 17, 1776, the British evacuated by sea and
sailed to Halifax to await reinforcements. The rescued British troops would
later be part of the force that nearly destroyed the Continental Army and the
American cause months later.
Following the standstill at Boston, Washington knew that New York
City was a target, as did many in Congress. However, the city was indefensi-
ble from the American military's perspective. General Lee questioned,
"What to do with the city I own puzzles me. It is so encircled with deep
navigable waters that whoever commands the sea must command the
Town."" Nevertheless, John Adams, who headed the Board of War in the
Continental Congress, urged Washington to defend the city. He expressed
the view that New York was "a kind of key to the whole continent... [and]
[n]o effort to secure it ought to be omitted." 9
Washington's decision to make a stand in New York was more of a po-
litical judgment than one of military strategy. It was his political sense that
Congress expected every effort to hold the city. Anything else would have a
devastating effect on the people and the American cause. The decision to
stand and fight at New York, however, was a disastrous one. Washington
observed hopelessly from across the East River as his troops were cut down
at Fort Washington and the survivors imprisoned on atrociously inhumane
prisoner barges. 90 By November 1776, Washington retreated with what was
86. "For advice on strategy and operations, Washington relied on a council of war
made up of his principal subordinate commanders... , conforming to his
original instructions from Congress." i RICHARD W. STEWART, AMERICAN
MILITARY HISTORY 61 (2005).
87. "Gen. [Washington] intend[ed] to bombard the Town... but a Council of War
ha[d] determined it [was] not . . . expedient." Richard Smith's Diary, in 3
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 346, 346 (Paul M. Smith ed. 1978).
88. Letter from Charles Lee to George Washington (Feb. 19, 1776), in 3 PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 82, at 340.
89. "Your commission constitutes you commander 'of all the Forces . . . and
[you] are vested with [the] full Power and Authority to act as you shall think
for the good and well fare of the service."' Letter from John Adams to George
Washington (Jan. 6, 1776), in 3 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note
82, at 37.
90. Letter From John Adams to Abigail Adams (Feb. 17, 1777), in 2 ADAMS FAMILY
CORRESPONDENCE 163, 163 (Lyman Butterfield ed., Cambridge ed. 1963) (cit-
ing a letter to his wife Abigail, in which he wrote, "I who am always made
miserable by the Misery of every sensible being, am obliged to hear continual
accounts of the barbarities, the cruel Murders in cold blood.. . committed by
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left of his battered army, confiding in his brother, "I am wearied almost to
death with the retrograde Motions of things."'" Washington, while exceed-
ingly deferential, did express his frustration with his lack of power. Unable
to even create a standing army, he "assured [Congress] that the longer they
delayed raising a standing army, the more difficult and chargeable would
they find it to get one."92 But his hands were tied. Greene urged Congress:
Greater Powers must be lodged in the Hands of the General than he
has ever yet exercised. It is impossible ... for him to be in Readiness
so early as General Howe... unless you delegate to him full Power
to take such Measures as he may find Necessary to promote the Es-
tablishment of the New Army. Time will not admit nor Circumstance
allow of a reference to Congress.93
From their experiences with Washington and the Revolution, it became
increasingly evident that Congress needed to adapt their understanding of
American commander-in-chief powers according to the realities of war.
While Congress debated, British forces, under the lead of General Charles
Cornwallis, sought to destroy the American cause by finishing off the Con-
tinental Army. On November 21, 1776, Cornwallis and an army of ten thou-
sand set off to catch Washington. The Pennsylvania Journal announced very
good intelligence that the British intended to push for Philadelphia and
Richard Henry of Virginia reported "much alarm" in the city and in Con-
gress.94 If captured by the British, the members of the Continental Congress
would surely be hanged as traitors to the King.
By December 1776, Congress concluded that the rule-by-committee ap-
proach did not work. Almost concurrently with Washington's symbolically
inspiring victory at Trenton, New Jersey, they passed the following resolu-
tion:
This Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis;
and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigour, and uprightness
of General Washington, do, hereby,
our Enemies .... These accounts harrow me beyond Description"). It is
within this context that Washington wrote to Howe in the letters discussed
infra in Subsection III.B.ii.
91. Letter from George Washington to John Augustine Washington (Nov. 19,
1776), in 7 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 82, at 105.
92. Letter from George Washington to Lund Washington (Sept. 30, 1776), in 6
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 138.
93. Letter from General Greene to John Hancock, the President of Congress (Dec.
21, 1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF GENERAL NATHANAEL GREENE 370, 372 (Rich-
ard K. Showman et al. eds., 1976) (emphasis added).
94. McCollough, supra note 85, at 255.
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Resolve, That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby,
vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect to-
gether, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of
these United States, 16 battalions of infantry... ; to appoint officers
for the said battalions; to raise, officer, and equip troops ... and to
establish their pay; to apply to any of the states for such aid of the
militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provi-
sions, and in such places, as he shall think proper; to displace and
appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier general, and to fill
up all vacancies in every other department in the American armies;
to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of
the army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable
price for the same; to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take
the continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the Ameri-
can cause; and return to the states of which they are citizens, their
names, and the nature of their offences, together with the witnesses
to prove them .... 9'
From this time through the end of the War, Congress looked to Washington
as the war strategist and allotted him great authority.
96
B. Washington's War: A Strengthened Commander
The powers Congress granted Washington in this December 1776 reso-
lution were seen as so sweeping that in a speech at the British House of
Commons, Lord George Germaine claimed that the Continental Congress
had made Washington the "dictator of America."97 Most importantly,
Washington himself understood his wartime powers to be sweeping. In his
response to Congress, he wrote:
[T]hey have done me the honor to intrust [sic] me with powers, in
my Military Capacity, of the highest nature and almost unlimited in
extent. Instead of thinking myself free'd from all civil Obligations,
by this mark of their Confidence, I shall constantly bear in mind,
that as the Sword was the last Resort for the preservation of our Lib-
95. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 58, at
1045-46.
96. See infra Section III.A for a discussion of the most pertinent information.
97. The Library of Congress, The Continental Congress Grants Washington
Greater Powers, http://rs6.loc.gov/learn/features/timeline/amrev/contarmy/
powers.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
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erties, so it ought to be the first thing laid aside, when those Liber-
ties are firmly established.98
Washington was finally the master of his troops and the conduct of the war.
One of Congress's final holds on Washington was removed when, in 1780,
Congress reconsidered a resolution that restricted the fighting to the United
States theater and voted "the restriction taken off."99
When it came to supplies, however, Washington continually deferred to
Congress. In an instance when Major General Heath sent Washington a
memorandum that he might "order the Stores to be supplied,""1° Washing-
ton answered "[as I am not acquainted by Congress with what steps they
have taken in the affair, nor with their present intentions concerning it, I do
not think myself authorized to comply with the requisition.'' 1 While eager
to have these forces properly supplied to fight against British General John
Burgoyne, a strategy which he made known to Congress, he did not view
himself as empowered to take action in this regard, instead referring the
matter for congressional consideration.0 2 While Washington viewed his
powers over strategy as broad, he nevertheless saw requisition of supplies-
whether obtained from the local populace or elsewhere-as Congress's do-
main.
After another victory on January 1, 1777, at Princeton, Washington
adopted a strategy of conducting small "hit and run" battles and then con-
tinually retreating in order to protect his army. 0 3 In attempting to avoid full
confrontation, Washington acquiesced to General William Howe's capture
98. Letter from George Washington to Robert Morris, George Clymer, and
George Walton (Jan. 1, 1777), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
supra note 16, at 464.
99. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Aug. 20, 178o),
in 19 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 402 n.52.
100. Letter from George Washington to The President of Congress (Jul. 27, 1777),
in 8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 487.
101. Letter from George Washington to Major General Heath (Jul. 27, 1777), in 8
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 482.
102. At other times, Congress did provide Washington with some discretion. They
had to approve the arms, but after this authorization, they would rely upon
Washington's judgment. Letter from George Washington to The Board of
War (Jul. 16, 1777), 8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16,
at 416 n.51.
103. JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 84 (Robert Faulkner &
Paul Courrese eds., Liberty Fund 2000) (1838). This is known as a Fabian
Strategy and is based upon Rome's Quintus Fabius Maximus's strategy to
wear down the stronger Carthaginian forces in the First Punic War. Like
Fabius Maximus's army, Washington's forces were also relatively weak.
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of the seat of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia. In contrast to what
occurred in New York, while "[p]ublic opinion.., and the opinion of Con-
gress, required a battle[,] ... Washington came to the wise determination of
avoiding one."1 4 While he had previously received orders from Congress,
Washington now dispatched Major General Nathaniel Greene to brief Con-
gress on his revised strategy. Greene reported back to Washington, "I ex-
plained to the House your Excellency's Ideas of the next Campaign [and] it
appear'd new to them."0 5 Washington had switched from asking Congress
to informing them of his actions. More empowered, Washington engaged
Howe in smaller battles through the Middle Colonies, retreating before
Howe could confront him with the full British force.
While Congress still controlled the purse, Washington's tone regarding
such matters switched to a more commanding one. At one point, he wrote:
I also take the liberty to request to be informed whether Congress in
two or three Months from the present period can rely on being able
to furnish Specie, or Bills on Europe .... I should also be glad if
Congress will have the goodness to assist me with some lights how far
the States of South and North Carolina have ability to contribute to
the Support of an Army in the Articles of Bread, Meat, Forage,
Horses and Waggons .... I entreat as speedy an answer as possible to
these points, which are of the greatest consequence in determining
our future plans, particularly I wish for immediate information on
the Subject of the money.
10 6
Such decisions as those pertaining to inoculations,0 7 military trials, and
troop deployment and recruitment were now his alone.
Throughout the war, "[tihe situation of General Washington['s army]
was.., perilous in the extreme."108 Many walking barefoot, the encamped
troops did not receive near the amount of support they needed and, conse-
quently, many perished.'0 9 Indeed supply was "[tihe problem that most
104. Id. at 98.
105. Letter from Nathanael Greene to George Washington (Mar. 24, 1777), in 7
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 82, at 627.
106. Letter from George Washington to Continental Congress (Sept. 8, 178o), in
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON PAPERS 1741-99, at 299, (Library of Congress, Se-
ries 3a Varick Transcripts), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/
P?mgw::./temp/-ammemYHQr::.
107. While initially hesitant, Washington inoculated his troops from smallpox
after the outbreak of February 1777. MARSHALL, supra note 103, at 84.
108. Id. at 81.
109. GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM 41 (1993) (emphasis added).
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vexed Washington," yet he did little more than complain to Congress that if
the "[States] cannot provide me with the means; it is in vain for them to
look to [him] for the end, and accomplishment of their wishes."" Despite
the dire lack of supplies, Washington steadfastly adhered to his understand-
ing of his commander-in-chief power, confiscating only with congressional
approval and a plan for repayment."' When mutiny erupted in New Jersey
over lack of these supplies, however, it was Washington's domain to make
the decision to "suppress the uprising with decisive force."" 2 It was clear
that in dealing with his troops and the enemy, the Commander in Chief
exercised full control' 13
Over the years, the small battles of Washington's Fabian strategy wore
upon Cornwallis's army, bolstering American optimism and the Continen-
tal Army's ranks. Although Major General Horatio Gates's victory at Sara-
toga in 1777, which prompted France and then Spain to declare war on Brit-
ain, was the turning point of the war," 4 Washington was still seen as the
personification of the fight for liberty. Choosing to personally remain at
Valley Forge alongside the troops and repeatedly lead the charges in the heat
of battle, Washington served as a symbol of hope that held the army to-
gether. While continuing smaller scale campaigns into the northeast, Wash-
ington eagerly awaited French support, which was slow to arrive. When
French troops and naval forces finally began to build, Congress "revived the
latent wish to annex" Canada." 5 Washington instead chose a strategy of
"not obeying their orders [and] the expedition against Canada was entirely,
though reluctantly, given up.
'"116
The British switched their focus to the Southern theater, where they en-
joyed greater loyalist support. After the defeat of Gates in South Carolina, all
who remained to harass British General Charles Cornwallis were guerrilla
110. Letter from George Washington to Benjamin Harrison (Mar. 21, 1781), in 21
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 342.
111. See, e.g., George Washington, Powers of Officers to Collect Clothing, Etc.
(Nov. 1777), in lo THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at
124, 124-25.
112. PHELPS, supra note lo9, at 41.
113. While Congress still controlled the supplies sent to the prisoners, when Howe
suggested a prisoner exchange in January 1778, "[o]n application of General
Washington, Congress acceded." MARSHALL, supra note 103, at 147 (emphasis
added).
114. While not leading the charge, Washington did play a role. "General Washing-
ton made great exertions to reinforce the northern army" and it paid off in
Gate's decisive defeat of Burgoyne. MARSHALL, supra note 103, at 120.
115. Id. at 170.
116. Id. at 172.
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bands under Francis Marion, Andrew Pickens, and Thomas Sumter. Na-
thaniel Greene, who assumed command of the southern force from Gates
and helped to regroup the army, was able to drive Cornwallis into Vir-
ginia."7 The Franco-American force led by Washington south from New
York combined with Greene's forces and was decisive in trapping the British
in Yorktown in 1781. With French naval support blocking their escape, the
British surrendered, ending the war.
C. Approval of Washington's Wartime Conduct
Some may question whether Washington's wartime actions were sup-
ported by the Framers and voters ex post. To answer this, it is important to
note that Washington emerged from the war an even greater hero, to the
point of "near deification.""' He was hailed as "the great soldier of liberty-
a man whose exceptional virtue and patriotism assured final triumph.""' 9 In
fact, "[t]he merest rumor that Washington might be passing through town
was sufficient to trigger spontaneous celebrations [and] these sentiments
ran so deeply that his critics ... felt it necessary to hold their tongues lest
they be deemed unpatriotic."'20 It is no stretch to say that virtually all of the
Framers respected his virtuous leadership. Indeed, their approval of his
wartime actions is evidenced by his unanimous election to the presidency of
the Convention. In fact, few debate that Washington could have made him-
self King.' Instead, he abided by certain rules of conduct, developed during
the war, which served as the precedent for the Framers' understanding of
the American commander in chief.'2 2 Part III delves into what that conduct
means for the modern presidency.
117. See id. at 228-43.
118. Phelps, supra note 107, at 24.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Wood, supra note 16, at 3 ("Though it was widely thought that Washing-
ton could have become king or dictator, he wanted nothing of the kind."). In
the famous conversation with American painter Jonathan Trumbull, George
III commented that if Washington were to return to the farm after his victory
rather than make himself King, "he will be the greatest man in the world."
Seymour Martin Lipset, George Washington and the Founding of Democracy, 9
J. DEMOCRACY 24 (1998) (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1993)). Indeed, "the god-like Washington was
certain to be the first President." Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power
of Presidency, 93 COL. L. REV. 1, 20 n.94 (citation omitted) (1993).
122. Pierce Butler, supra note 69, at 302.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE WASHINGTON MODEL: THE POWERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON VS. THE ACTIONS OF GEORGE W. BUSH
Having established Washington as the appropriate model for under-
standing the powers inherent in the American commander in chief and
provided the context of the circumstances in which he was operating
throughout the Revolution, this Part draws out the implications that are
most relevant to contemporary debate. 123 It is not the purpose of this Part to
compare Washington and Bush as individuals. Instead, in the forthcoming
Parts, this Note evaluates George W. Bush's actions based on George Wash-
ington's Revolutionary War precedent. 124 This narrow perspective enables
the ambitious new analysis of hotly debated issues. This Note does not pur-
port to address the many nuances of each debate, but rather to focus purely
on the original intent support for executive wartime authority, or lack
thereof. Comparison of the first commander's actions to the contempo-
rary's provides insight into the broader nature of constitutional com-
mander-in-chief powers.
121
A. Congressional Consultation During Times of War
Since its enactment over President Nixon's veto in 1973, every President
has taken the position that the War Powers Resolution is an "unconstitu-
tional infringement by the Congress on the President's authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief."' 26 While much of the War Powers Resolution deals with
initiation of hostilities,1 27 this Note addresses section 3, which "requires the
123. See Symposium, The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus
Congress' War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, for a
background debate during the Reagan Administration on war powers.
124. It may be argued that Washington was confronting a much more dire sit-
uation-one of literal life and death not only for soldiers, but regular citizens
and even statesmen as well-while Bush can hardly claim such dire straits.
Thus, Bush's power should be prorated according to this diminished context.
Especially in light of the September 1, 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, it is
nearly impossible to accurately assess the direness of the situation. This Note
does not attempt any such assessment and merely purports to address
whether there is original intent evidence for various commander-in-chief
powers.
125. Each Part is structured in the same manner: introduction to the present
debate, discussion of the relevant historical evidence, and relation of the
Washington model to the Bush Administration's inherent powers.
126. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, WAR POWERS RESOLU-
TION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 2 (2004), http://www.fas.org/man/crs/
IB81oso.pdf.
127. As discussed in Part II, hostilities had commenced prior to Washington's
actions, rendering inapplicable any questions regarding the initiation of hos-
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President 'in every possible instance' to consult with Congress before intro-
ducing U.S. armed forces into situations of hostilities and imminent hostili-
ties, and to continue consultations as long as the armed forces remain."'28
At the time of his commission, Congress kept Washington on a short
leash.'29 The Commander was obliged "punctually to observe and follow
such orders and directions, from time to time, as [he] shall receive from
this, or a future Congress of these United Colonies, or committee of Con-
gress." 3 ° As discussed in Part II, Congress attempted to manage strategic
and even tactical aspects of the war by committee. However, in restricting
Washington, the "Continental Congress's best attempts to make war were
essentially failures."'' Congress soon concluded that their "arrangement
failed miserably, and . . . surrendered their powers to the field com-
mander."'32
"Experience taught the framers [an] important lesson during this pe-
riod: the war powers needed to be fixed to guarantee effective common
defense."'3 To remedy the situation, Congress passed the aforementioned
December 27, 1776 resolution134 and reaffirmed Washington's powers in
votes throughout the war. Both Congress and Washington understood the
commander's authority over strategy and troops to be necessarily complete
in order to effectively conduct a war.'35 With the Framers bringing this ex-
perience to the Convention, the "most sensible textual inference is to read
the Commander-in-Chief Clause as a constitutional constraint on the other
two federal branches, especially Congress, from interfering with the Presi-
dent's command of U.S. military forces."'
1 36
tilities. MARSHALL, supra note 103, at 22. See Major Michael P. Kelly, Fixing
The War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REV. 83 (1993), for a general discussion of the his-
torical context of the Resolution.
128. GRIMMETT, supra note 126, at 12 (citing War Powers Resolution of 1973 (Pub.
L. 93-148, 88 Stat. 555)) (emphasis added).
129. 2 JOURNALS or THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 58, at 96
(reprinting General Washington's June 17, 1775 Commission).
130. Id.
131. Kelly, supra note 127, at 110.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 95.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
136. Julian G. Ku, Is There an Exclusive Commander-in-Chief Power?, 115 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 84, 84 (20o6), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2oo6/o3/ku.html.
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Although the Continental Congress relinquished control over strategy,
it still required that it be informed.3 7 Washington was obliged "to appoint a
proper person at headquarters to write to the president [of the Congress]
twice a day, or oftener if necessary, advising the position and movements of
the armies."'3 Although there were gaps in communication during crucial
junctures of intense fighting, Washington conscientiously sought to com-
ply.'39 This would suggest that while the commander in chief has broad
discretion in deciding tactics and strategy, he is obliged to communicate his
decisions to Congress as the situation permits. This parallels current debate.
President Bush has contended that the War Powers Resolution only requires
that he notify Congress of his decisions ex post. 4 ° President Bush is not the
only President to approach the War Powers Resolution in this fashion, how-
137. An important caveat is that Washington's status during the Revolution was as
an agent of Congress. This Note does not seek to address whether the Presi-
dent has additional powers under his executive authority rather than under
his commander-in-chief powers specifically. The modern President, like
Washington under the Continental Congress, "is Commander-in-Chief and
[is] accountable for obeying acts of Congress" to this day. As during the Revo-
lution, the "Commander-in-Chief... is precisely accountable to Congress'
decision to constrain the use of the armed forces. It is Congress' option to
impose such restrictions as it deems appropriate" as long as the powers are
not already inherent in the Commander-in-Chief Clause. Bennett, supra note
123, at 27-28.
138. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 11, 1777),
in 9 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 207-08 n.i.
139. Washington was unable to write Congress at crucial junctures, evidenced by
gaps in the dates of his writings during times of intense fighting. For example,
Washington writes Congress on January 1, 1777, without informing them of
any strategy, and then conducts his route of the British at Princeton, during
which he interrupts his usual constant communication with the President of
Congress for four days, and then notifies Congress of his sneak attack after
the fact. 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 46o-71.
140. President Bush has made several reports to Congress pursuant to the War
Powers Resolution. On January 22, 2004, he reported that the United States
was continuing to deploy combat equipped military personnel Bosnia and
Herzegovina. About i,8o0 U.S. personnel were participating. On February 25,
2004, he reported that, on February 23, he had sent a "security force" of about
fifty-five U.S. troops to Haiti to reinforce the U.S. Embassy security forces
there. On March 2, 2004, he reported that on February 29 he had sent about
"200 additional U.S. combat-equipped, military personnel from the U.S. Joint
Forces Command to Port-au-Prince, Haiti." And on March 20, 2004, he re-
ported details of multiple on-going military deployments and operations "in
support of the global war on terrorism." GRIMMETT, supra note 126, at 14-15.
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ever. Certainly, the Washington model supports the Presidents' conduct
described in the Congressional Research Service's conclusion that
[a] review of instances involving the use of armed forces since pas-
sage of the Resolution, listed above, indicates there has been very lit-
tle consultation with Congress under the Resolution when consulta-
tion is defined to mean seeking advice prior to a decision to intro-
duce troops. Presidents have met with congressional leaders after
the decision to deploy was made .... "
The Washington model suggests that Presidents have been acting prop-
erly according to the original intent of their commander-in-chief powers. As
evidenced by Washington's actions and writings described supra in Part II,
by the end of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress had devel-
oped the understanding that their commander in chief possessed strategic
control and discretion. The Constitution "make[s] clear that within an au-
thorized field of ... war, the President is made the responsible agent of con-
ducting that war as Commander-in-Chief... [and] prohibit[s] Congress
from meddling in the particulars or minutia of tactics in the combat
zone." 142 However, Washington was-and, according to the originalist ap-
proach, so is President Bush today-obligated to notify Congress of his
actions. 143
Congress has contended that "consultation in [section 3 of the War
Powers Resolution] means that a decision is pending on a problem and that
Members of Congress are being asked by the President for their advice and
opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their approval of action con-
templated."' 144 Approaching this issue from a purely originalist understand-
ing would suggest that Congress is overstepping its bounds.' 45 Just as the
141. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
142. Bennett, supra note 123, at 37 (discussing declared wars). What constitutes a
"declared war" is beyond the scope of this Note. The Revolutionary War was
not declared in exactly the same way that World War Two was, but did have
the backing of the Continental Congress since they were the ones running the
war. Likewise, Iraq was not declared like World War Two but had Congres-
sional authorization. This quote is merely meant to show the parallels be-
tween Washington's congressionally authorized war and Bush's congression-
ally authorized wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
143. While not in contention in this debate, it is worth noting that the contempo-
rary Congress, similar to the Continental Congress, also has the power over
supplies via their funding power.
144. GRIMMETT, supra note 126, at 12 (emphasis added).
145. It is not the purpose of this Note to delve into how subsequent statutes,
enacted according to Congress's constitutional powers, have altered the Presi-
dent's obligations.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
Continental Congress learned-the hard way146 -- that an effective com-
mander in chief needed to have discretion in his military decisions rather
than being micromanaged by committee, the modern Congress should un-
derstand the original intent of the Commander-in-Chief Clause to support
President Bush's claim to such authority.
President Bush has also been faulted for not keeping Congress better in-
formed of his decisions after the fact. 147 In 2006, the bipartisan Congres-
sional Research Service concluded that "the Bush administration's limited
briefings for Congress on the National Security Agency's domestic eaves-
dropping.., are 'inconsistent with the law."' 14' The analysis faulted the
Administration with only informing the "Gang of Eight" leading Republican
and Democratic leaders of the House and Senate. 149 There is a historical
record of Presidents, regardless of party, limiting sensitive information shar-
146. See supra Part II for a discussion of the military blunders experienced while
Congress attempted to micromanage the war via committee.
147. President Bush has been accused repeatedly by his (typically partisan)
opponents of not properly reporting the intelligence used as justification for
invading Iraq and not promptly reporting to Congress evidence against Iraq's
possession of weapons of mass destruction after the invasion. See JIMMY
CARTER, OUR ENDANGERED VALUES: AMERICA'S MORAL CRISIS 150 (2005)
(faulting the Bush administration for using "false and distorted claims after
9/11."); Kerry Responds to Bush Attacks: White House Misleading Public on
Prewar Iraq Intelligence (Nov. 14, 2005), http://kerry.senate.gov/v3/cfn/
record.cfm?id=248761 ("The White House has admitted that the President
told Congress and the American public in the State of the Union address that
Saddam was attempting to acquire fuel for nuclear weapons despite the fact
that the CIA specifically told the Administration three times, in writing and
verbally, not to use this intelligence.... This is not relying on faulty intelli-
gence, as Democrats did; it is knowingly, and admittedly, misleading the
American public on a key justification for going to war."); Ron Martz, Embed
Catches Heat, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, May 15, 2003, http://www.editorandpub-
lisher.com/eandp/news/articledisplay.jsp?vnu contentid=18865o8 ("There
must have been two wars in Iraq. There was the war I saw and wrote about as
a print journalist embedded with a tank company of the Army's 3rd Infantry
Division (Mechanized). Then there was the war that many Americans saw
... ."); Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq, 85 FOREIGN AFF.
15, 15 (2006) ("In the wake of the Iraq war, it has become clear that... intelli-
gence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made, that damaging
ill will developed between policymakers and intelligence officers, and that the
intelligence community's own work was politicized.").
148. Scott Shane, Report Questions Legality of Briefings on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2006, at A19.
149. Id.
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ing to certain members of Congress 5 ° and the Washington model provides
some limited potential original intent arguments in support of this practice.
"Clearly, the Constitution envisions.., regular involvement by the Con-
gress in military affairs.""' Historically, it is acceptable to withhold infor-
mation when completely necessary, as Washington found it to be while in
the heat of certain battles." 2 While this exception is seemingly most appli-
cable when it is impossible to transmit the information-and it is therefore
unacceptable to only inform all of Congress when it is politically conven-
ient-it nevertheless leaves open a window for the argument that the sensi-
tivity of information makes full disclosure an impossibility without negative
security repercussions.5 3 Additionally, Washington addressed his briefings
150. The National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2000), "contemplates more
limited disclosure in the case of exceptionally sensitive matters.... It has long
been the pratice of both Democratic and Republican administrations to in-
form [just] the Chair and Ranking Members of the Intelligence Committees
about exceptionally sensitive matters." Letter from William E. Moschello, As-
sistant Attorney General to the Honorable Dianne Feinstein, Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate (Feb. 28, 20o6), http://www.usdoj.gov/
ag/readingroom/surveillance2o.pdf. The Congressional Research Committee
determined that Intelligence Committee leaders "over time have accepted the
executive branch of limiting notification of intelligence activities in some
cases." This is because "the President is [under the National Security Act of
1947] legally authorized to limit congressional access to a covert action finding
if he determines that it is essential to do so in order "to meet extraordinary
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States." ALFRED CUM-
MING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY PROCEDURES UNDER WHICH
CONGRESS Is To BE INFORMED OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING
COVERT ACTIONS 10 (20o6), http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/
crsn8o6.pdf.
151. Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law In The United States, 49 A.F.L.
REV. 67, 78 (2000). But see Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Presidential War Power:
Do the Courts Offer any Answers?, 157 MIL. L. REV. 18o, 183 (1998) (noting that
although the Constitution understood there to be "congressional predomi-
nance[,] ... primary authority over the war power has shifted from that rep-
resentative body to the executive branch").
152. Such as when Washington was planning on staging his sneak attack on the
British at Princeton and did not communicate it Congress, as discussed supra
note 140, or when President Bush has information that is so sensitive that a
leak-if found to be likely to occur-would endanger his military strategy.
See 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 46o-67.
153. The Congressional Research Service Report concedes this possible argument.
See Shane, supra note 148 ("The executive branch may assert that the mere
discussion of the N.S.A. program generally could expose certain intelligence
sources and methods to disclosure.").
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primarily to the President of Congress or just the Board of War.'54 While
limited correspondence was mostly due to practical necessity' 5 and the
information was usually then referred to other members of Congress at the
receiving parties' discretion, 15 6 this may be analogous to only informing a
select group (i.e. the Gang of Eight) on certain military matters. These pos-
sible precedents for argument aside, the general takeaway from the Wash-
ington model is that Congress is within its right to demand that it be regu-
larly informed of military actions after the fact, and the President is obliged
to obey except under specific circumstances.
This is not the only issue of current debate for which the Washington
model provides pointed original intent. The following Section delves into
facets of the commander in chief's wartime decision-making power over
American citizens. While this Note finds originalist evidence for deferring to
the Commander's authority when engaging foreigners, it finds the Com-
mander's power to be heavily curtailed when engaging American citizens.
B. Rights of Americans
At his Senate confirmation hearings, Justice Alito said, "our Constitu-
tion applies in times of peace and in times of war, and it protects the rights
of Americans under all circumstances."'5 7 George Washington's Revolu-
tionary precedent for the Commander-in-Chief Clause largely supports this
notion. Washington's actions as commander in chief depict a stark contrast
154. See generally THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, in
which Washington repeatedly writes to the President and not the full Con-
gress.
155. Dealing mutinies and staggering losses to the British, see, e.g., MARSHALL,
supra note 103, at 245, the young republic was too busy holding the Continen-
tal Army together to have separate letters delivered by courier to each mem-
ber of Congress. See supra note 138 (reporting that, rather than having letters
delivered to all members of Congress or even the entire Board of War, Con-
gress only requested that Washington write to the President of Congress, who
would presumably disseminate as prudent).
156. Presidents presided over the United Colonies/States of America's unicameral
government executing congressional laws, treaties, and military orders, called
for congressional assembly and adjournment, signed military commissions
including George Washington's commander-in-chief appointment, received
foreign dignitaries, received, read, answered, and at their own discretion held
or disseminated the official mail addressed to them as the President of the
United States and President of Congress. A Founding Presidential Exhibit,
http://uspresidency.com/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
157. Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, ogth Cong. (2006) (statement of Sam-
uel A. Alito, Jr., Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit).
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between the powers he possessed over non-citizens versus those over
Americans. Even to the detriment of the Continental Army, he was incredi-
bly careful not to infringe upon the rights of Americans. Article I, Section
9's reservation to Congress of the power to suspend habeas corpus and the
Takings Clause both strongly reflect Washington's notion of the laws by
which he was operating as commander in chief. Based upon the Washington
model, it is no surprise that these powers were specifically addressed in the
Constitution-and in the case of the suspension of habeas corpus, explicitly
granted to Congress-rather than viewed as inherent under the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause. The following two subsections analyze the original
intent of commander-in-chief powers over Americans.
1. Suspending Habeas Corpus
On April 3, 2006, the Supreme Court decided not to hear the habeas
corpus petition of Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen who was held for more than
three years in military custody as an enemy combatant. 5 ' The District
Court for the Southern District of New York had "accepted the Govern-
ment's contention that the President has authority as Commander in Chief
to detain as enemy combatants citizens captured on American soil during a
time of war." '159 The Supreme Court's basis for dismissing the case rested on
the fact that Padilla has been released from military custody and is being
tried in federal District Court with a criminal defendant's full Constitutional
protections. Three Justices, however, warned that "[w]ere the Government
to seek to change the status or conditions of Padilla's custody, [the courts]
should act promptly to ensure that the office and purposes of the writ of
habeas corpus are not compromised.' 160 Based upon Washington's actions
during the revolution, this Section argues that Padilla's three-year military
detention was inconsistent with the Washington model and the original
intent of commander-in-chief powers. 16' As indicated by the Supreme
158. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1o62 (2006).
159. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 433 (2004); see also Press Release, Depart-
ment of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo, Director of Public Affairs, on the
Padilla Decision (Dec. 18, 2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2oo3/12/
doj1218o3.html (arguing that the detention was justified because "President
Bush, acting as Commander in Chief, determined that... Jose Padilla, is an
enemy combatant who poses a serious and continuing threat to national secu-
rity [so he] was subsequently transferred from the custody of the Justice De-
partment to the control of the Defense Department").
160. Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1o64.
161. While it was not unknown for Americans to be held and treated as foreign
combatants throughout the Revolution, this was due to the difficulty of classi-
fying whether the individual was an American or implanted by the British:
"The examination that is made.., is somewhat irregular, and out of the
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Court, only now that the Administration released Padilla to the jurisdiction
of the federal courts is President Bush back within the limits of his com-
mander-in-chief powers.
The Continental Congress's experiences with their commander in chief
reflected Washington's view of his own powers over fellow Americans. This
view can be summarized by a letter to Congress in which he explained:
"whatever Military Powers shall be intrusted to me, shall ever be exerted
first to establish and then protect the Civil."'1 62 Indeed, "[u]nlike other revo-
lutionary leaders, both ancient and modern, Washington never declared
martial law over civilians while conducting the war, demonstrating that a
republican government could fight effectively in the face of overwhelming
odds without resorting to the suspension of civil liberties." 163 The Washing-
ton model provides evidence that in the case of private Americans the mili-
tary is subservient to the civil power in determining the proper trial.
In the beginning of the war, Washington agonized over whether he
could decree that American civilians who aided the British be tried by mili-
tary commissions. He wrote that a
doubt has arisen whether a person who belongs to any of the United
States of America... that went to the Enemy some time past, and
since that time has been lurking about any of the Fortifications[,]
... plundering[,] ... Recruiting for them, or committing any other
attrocious Crimes... can be tryed by a Genl. Court Martial... and
punished as a Spy.
164
common order to things; but in the.., unsettled State of government, the
distinction between Civilian and Military power, cannot be upheld with that
exactness which every friend to Society must wish." Letter from Washington
to Governor Jonathan Trumbull (Apr. 21, 1777), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 450 n.9o. In modern times, this de-
fense holds little weight, as a person's citizenship may be much more easily
ascertained, as Padilla's was.
162. Letter from George Washington to the New York Legislature (Dec. 16, 1776),
in 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 382-83.
163. Christopher A. Chrisman, Article III Goes to War: A Case For A Separate
Federal Circuit for Enemy Combatant Habeas Cases, 21 J.L. & POL. 31, 40 (2005);
see also Davies, supra note 151, at 76 (discussing presidential declaration of
martial law). Martial law can be defined as "the rule which is established when
civil authority in the community is made subordinate to military, either in re-
pelling invasions or when the ordinary administration of the laws fail[s] to se-
cure the proper objects of the government." Id. at 86-87 (quoting WILLIAM E.
BIRCHIME, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW, 371 (3d rev'd ed.
1914)).
164. Letter from George Washington to Philip Livingston et al. (July 19, 1777), in 8
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 439, 444-45.
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This "doubt" blossomed into outright admonishment after a hanging
occurred a little more than a week later. American Brigadier General Preud-
homme De Borre had tried a Tory by court-martial and had him exe-
cuted.'65 Washington reproved, "[W]ith respect to the Tory .... though his
crime was heinous enough to deserve the fate he met with .... it was a mat-
ter that did not come within the jurisdiction of martial law."' 66 There is
indeed evidence of other occasions in which other Tories were tried by mili-
tary court-martial, but Washington's concern was that such trials only be
held in strict adherence to the civil power's directives.'67 When it came to
the crime of spying, Congress explicitly granted court-martial jurisdiction
and only by such a Congressional Resolution did the military have such
control over an American's trial.'68 As was the case with Joshua Smith, an
American implicated in the famous Andre Affair for spying and only there-
fore tried by military court martial, the civil power rather than military
leaders was supposed to decide the appropriate trials.'69 What is significant
about the Tory cases is that the Commander in Chief had jurisdiction over
165. The details of the crime are unclear.
166. Letter from George Washington to Brigadier General Preudhomme De Borre
(Aug. 3, 1777), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at
6-7.
167. In reading through Benedict Arnold's papers, Washington found evidence of
the trials of Jonathan Loverberry, Nathaniel Ackesly, and Reuben Weeks. In-
terestingly, each of these three trials was initiated by Benedict Arnold, not
Washington. Washington learned of these trials while reading through Ar-
nold's papers after he was discovered to be a spy, and did not confirm the sen-
tences as he usually did in other cases. Letter from George Washington to Ma-
jor General William Heath, General Orders (Oct. 24, 178o), in 20 THE WRIT-
INGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 252-53; see also WALLACE
BROWN, THE GOOD AMERICANS: THE LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 138 (1969) (describing journalist accounts of Tory executions).
168. Hence, Washington's fixation on whether "a person who belongs to any of
the United States of America... can be tried.., and punished as a spy." Let-
ter from George Washington to Philip Livingston et al., supra note 164, at
444-45-
169. Loyalists like Smith were indeed tried in courts-martial on occasions
throughout the war, but this is due to the "Civil Power," that is, Congress,
telling Washington to try spies in this manner. See Resolution of the Conti-
nental Congress (Aug. 21, 1776), in 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS 1774-1778, at 693 (1906) ("[AIll persons, not members of, nor owing al-
legiance to any of the United States of America ... who shall be found lurking
as spies in or about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the
United States... shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of na-
tions by sentence of a court martial, or such other punishment as such court-
martial shall direct.").
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Loyalists only due to a explicit Congressional authorization, and Washing-
ton steadfastly adhered to his subservience to civil authority when dealing
with Americans. 7 Aside from charges of spying, Loyalists were to be tried
in civilian courts, with fair trials and representation as decided by Con-
gress.' 7' Showing great deference to Congress and the states, Washington
clarified the basis for his conduct, writing, "It is not my desire, neither in-
deed is it within my power, [to interfere with] the Civil Power. [Civil au-
thorities] best know the Charge and Merit of the Case, [and] consequently
should ultimately determine it."
72
Analogously, Padilla, a private citizen accused of turning to the enemy,
can only be tried according to congressional-and not the Commander in
Chief's-discretion. According to the Washington model, while President
Bush may have broad powers in handling foreign combatants, original in-
tent evidence suggests that his power over private Americans is heavily cur-
tailed. Washington made it quite clear that "[tihe establishment of military
law where the civil prevails, is a measure of extreme necessity, and which
[the commander in chief has] no authority to recommend."'' 73 This strongly
supports Justice Kennedy's assertion that Padilla should be afforded "the
protection, including the right to a speedy trial, guaranteed to all federal
criminal defendants." '174 From an originalist perspective, it is beyond Bush's
commander-in-chief powers to direct otherwise. 17 In a matter tangential to
Padilla's case, but representative of Washington's actions regarding the
170. Id; see also The Continental Congress's Answer to George Washington's
Resignation Address Annapolis, Maryland, Dec. 23, 1783, http://gwpapers.vir-
ginia.edu/documents/revolution/congress.html ("You have conducted the
great military contest with wisdom and fortitude invariably regarding the
rights of the civil power through all disasters and changes.").
171. John Ross successfully represented "Loyalists prosecuted by [Congressman
Joseph] Reed in the state courts." WILLARD STERNE RANDALL, BENEDICT AR-
NOLD: PATRIOT AND TRAITOR 427 (1990).
172. Letter from George Washington to Brigadier General Thomas Mifflin (Feb.
14, 1777), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 151.
173. Letter from George Washington to Colonel Daniel Brodhead (May 21, 1779),
in 15 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 119.
174. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1o62, 1o63 (2006) (Mem.) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari).
175. There may be one exception to this: Washington determined that Thomas
Shanks, an ensign in the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment, should be tried by
special tribunal. See Letter from George Washington to the Board of General
Officers (June 2, 1778), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra
note 16, at ii. However, Shanks was not a private citizen, and it is not even
clear whether he was even an American or a British plant.
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rights of his fellow Americans, the remainder of this Section discusses
Washington's treatment of American property rights.
2. Seizure ofAmerican Property
After the intelligence failings surrounding the second war in Iraq, Presi-
dent Bush, by Executive Order No. 13,328, established the Silberman-Robb
Commission to assess the state of the United States' intelligence capabili-
ties. 116 In response to the committee's seventy four suggestions for improv-
ing the U.S. intelligence effort, Bush issued Executive Order 13,382.' This
order provided for the seizure of "all property and interests in property...
in the United States" of
[a]ny ... United States person determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, and other relevant agencies, to have provided, or at-
tempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other sup-
port for, or goods or services in support of, any activity or transac-
tion [to a list of suspected terrorist organizations].' 78
Some were immediately alarmed by Bush's broad new power to "seize
the assets of any person [including Americans].' 79 While President Bush
claims this power stems from "the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,"18' it is only
within the scope of this Note to examine the original intent of the constitu-
tional commander-in-chief powers with respect to the seizure of assets."l ' It
176. Comm'n on the Intelligence Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction, About the Commission, http://www.wmd. gov/about.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
177. Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (July 1, 2005).
178. Id.
179. Bush Sets up Domestic Spy Service, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2005, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4636117.stm.
180. "By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws
of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §17Ol et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergen-
cies Act (50 U.S.C. §16ol et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States
Code.... ." Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (July 1, 2005). This ref-
erence to the Constitution may merely be form language which is found in
numerous executive orders, and President Bush may be leaning more on
power stemming from the cited acts rather than constitutional authority. Re-
gardless, this allusion to constitutional power invites academic research into'
the question of the sufficiency of constitutional authority to seize property.
181. The authority stemming from acts of Congress subsequent to the Constitu-
tion are therefore beyond the scope of this Note.
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is unclear whether the President is referring to anything other than his Con-
stitutional Authority to execute the laws, but the debate surrounding this
order urges the question of whether the Commander-in-Chief Clause can be
used as a basis for seizing American assets. Indeed, while the President may
very well possess the power via statute, the Washington model suggests that
he lacks the power to seize American citizens' property under the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause.
This current debate is somewhat reminiscent of President Harry Tru-
man's actions during a crisis during the Korean War. Facing the threat of a
nationwide strike in the national steel industry, Truman issued an Executive
Order commanding the "Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most
of the steel mills [to] keep them running." ''"2 He contended that the "work
stoppage would immediately jeopardize" national security.' 3 In Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,"4 the steel companies brought proceedings
against the Secretary. The administration argued that the strike "would so
endanger the well-being and safety of the Nation that the President had
'inherent power' to do what he had done-power 'supported by the Consti-
tution."' "5 The ramifications of this case pertain to contemporary debate. It
is speculated that "when Congress holds hearings on whether the president
has exceeded his powers [in strengthening U.S. intelligence capabilities], the
Supreme Court's ruling in the steel seizure case will be the closest thing to
settled law on the matter."'8 6 This Section specifically determines that sei-
zure or conversion of American property is not inherent in the original
understanding of the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
Much of Washington's correspondence involves his attempts to compel
his army to respect the property of other Americans. Indeed, "[t] he General
[was] resolved to put a stop to plundering, and converting either public, or
182. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
183. Id. (quoting Executive Order 10,340).
184. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
185. Id. at 584.
186. Peter S. Canellos, The Truman Precedent for Bush's Eavesdropping, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2005, at A3. The Steel Seizure Case is also invoked by Senator
Russ Feingold, Introducing a Resolution to Censure President George W. Bush
(Mar. 13, 20o6), http://www.feingold.senate.gov/statements/o6/03/2oo6313-
.html. See also William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for Na-
tional Security Surveillance, 5o AM. U.L. REV. 1, 74 (2001); Douglas C. McNabb
& Matthew R. McNabb, Of Bugs, the President, and the NSA: National Security
Agency Intercepts Within the United States, 30 NAT'L Assoc. OF CRIM. DEF.
LAWYERS: CHAMPION 10 n.578 (2006).
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private property, to [the military's] own use."187 He reacted swiftly and
strictly when it came to his attention that anyone in his army went against
this resolve. Washington expelled Colonel Serjeant's regiment from the
army after the court-martial found them "guilty of the infamous Crime of
plundering."' Disapproving of any leniency in this regard, after the court-
martial found Ensign Matthew Macumber innocent for taking looking
glasses and women's clothes, Washington "ordered a Reconsideration of the
matter, upon which.... they made Shift to Cashier him."18 9
Congress authorized Washington
to take, wherever he may be, all such provisions and other articles as
may be necessary for the comfortable subsistence of the army under
his command, paying or giving certificates for the same: to remove
and secure, for the benefit of the owners, all goods and effects which
may be serviceable to the enemy ....
Resolved, That the public faith be pledged for the payment of
the provisions or other articles to be taken, and for which certifi-
cates shall have been given, at such prices as are expressed in the
certificates; or, if the prices are not expressed, to be paid for as the
same shall be valued by commissioners for that purpose .... "'
Throughout the war, Washington meticulously insisted that the troops in
his command abide by the repayment principle expressed in the second
paragraph of the above resolution.
Even with his Continental Army starving, Washington was still unwill-
ing to compromise his principles regarding the sanctity of private property.
Only under very specific circumstances, and providing adequate restitution
(echoed in the Takings Clause) would Washington confiscate supplies for
the good of the nation. In one notable case, Washington reasoned, "[i]t
being represented to me that the Millers, either from an unwillingness to
part with their Flour, or the difficulty of obtaining Wheat from the Farmers,
do not Imploy their Mills, by which means the Army under my Command
is like to suffer for want of Bread."'' Faced with this crisis, and fighting to
save the Continental Army, the manner in which he handles the miller is
187. George Washington, General Orders (Sept. 6, 1776), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 24, 25.
188. Id. at 88, 91.
189. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 1776),
in 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 106, 115.
190. 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note 58, at 752-
53 (Sept. 17, 1777).
191. Letter from George Washington to Carpenter Wharton (Dec. 14, 1776), in 6
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 409.
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telling: "I do hereby Authorize and Instruct you to enquire into the State of
this matter; with full powers if it should be found that the default is in the
Miller, to Sieze [sic] the Mill and grain, and Imploy it for the use of the Pub-
lic... paying the full Value ... ,,192 Rather than taking the grain to save his
troops, he instead used a process that respected the miller's property and
allowed for compensation. Similarly, when much of the army was un-
clothed, Washington ordered "I hereby Authorize to collect all such Blan-
kets, Shoes, Stocking and other Clothing... as the Inhabitants can spare
without greatly distressing their Families."193 However, as always, Washing-
ton viewed compensation as mandatory. He ordered, "[Y]ou are to give
Certificates to the Inhabitants of the Quantity and Value of each Species you
receive from them," 94 which the Americans could later use for reimburse-
ment.
Throughout the war, extensive loyalist property was seized by the re-
volting colonists; however, Washington sought to stop these actions. In June
1778, Washington ordered his troops "to preserve tranquility and order...
and give security to individuals of every class and description [from] every
species of persecution, insult or abuse, either from the soldiery to the in-
habitants or among each other.""19 As with "patriot" Americans, Washing-
192. Id. Only by the desire of Congress did Washington take a harsher stance at
one point, writing "I have, by [Congress's] desire, issued a Proclamation or-
dering the Farmers to Thresh out their Wheat and prepare it for Mill, and that
in case of Noncompliance within certain Periods, it shall be Siezed upon for
the use of the Army and only paid for as Straw." Letter from George Wash-
ington to Major General John Armstrong, (Dec. 28, 1777), in 1O THE WRIT-
INGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 216.
193. Powers of Officers to Collect Clothing, Etc. (Nov. 1777), in lo THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 124.
194. Id. at 124-25.
195. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (June 18, 1778),
in 7 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 69 n.3. Al-
though he sought to protect Loyalists, Washington was more inclined to give
his troops' discretion the benefit of the doubt, such as when Major Ballard
was faced with felony charges in New York for confiscating Loyalist property.
Washington wrote to New York Governor George Clinton, that "the good of
the service sometimes requires things to be done in the military line, which
cannot be supported by the civil law." Letter from George Washington to
Governor George Clinton (Dec. 13, 1779), in 17 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 252-53. Washington, however, made clear to
Clinton that he would nevertheless not tolerate any confiscations where there
were "appearances of oppression or fraud" or "spirit of plunder." Id. at 253.
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ton made provisions to protect-and, if confiscated, for repayment of-
Tory property. 1
9 6
It was the Continental Congress and state legislatures who often ordered
the confiscations' 97 while the Commander in Chief merely obliged,'98 taking
special care to avoid "greatly distressing the[] families" and ensure for
means of proper reimbursement. 9 9 After Congress ordered loyalists out of
their homes in Philadelphia in 1778, Washington sent a letter of protest,
contending that "[a] proscribing system of Laws having the same effect,
when carried to a great extent, ever appeared to [him] to be impolitic;
and.., to exile many of its Inhabitants cannot be the interest of any
State."2 °° While disagreeing with some of their actions, Washington under-
stood confiscation of loyalist property as under the discretion of the legisla-
tures', and not the commander's, powers ordering that "the persons who are
known to be enemies to their Country, be seized and confin'd, and their
Property disposed of, as the Law of the State directs."'' He added teeth to
196. Repayment was indeed authorized by Congress after the war, see 26 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINTENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, supra note 58, at 26 (Jan. 14,
1784) when it ratified the Treaty of Paris (Art. V), although the question of
how many of the Loyalists were actually reimbursed is debatable. "The Chro-
nology of Mifflin's presidency is as follows .... January 14 Ratifies definitive
treaty of peace, 'nine states being present'; recommends that the states 'pro-
vide for the restitution of confiscated loyalist property." Stanley L. Klos,
Thomas Mifflin: 5th President of the United States in Congress Assembled
November 3, 1783 to June 3, 1784, http://www.virtualology.com/ uspresidents/
thomasmifflin.org/mifflinct/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
197. See, e.g., 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, supra note
58, at 605-06 (July 24, 1776) (discussing Congressional actions); Letter from
George Washington to the President of Congress (Jan. 30, 1776), in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 287 n.57 (referencing
confiscation by the state of New York).
198. Washington noted that he was acting "by the virtue of the powers vested in
[Washington] by the Honorable Congress" rather than an assumed com-
mander-in-chief power. io THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra
note 16, at 124.
199. Id. See also George Washington, General Orders (Jan. 21, 1777), in 7 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 46-47 ("plundering the
Inhabitants under the notion of their being Tories, or venduing [sic] of Plun-
der taken from the Enemy, in any other manner than these Orders direct, may
expect to be punished in the severest manner.").
200. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (June 2, 1778), in
12 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 8-9.
201. George Washington, General Orders (Jan. 21, 1777), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 46-47.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
this conviction, explaining "plundering the Inhabitants under the notion of
their being Tories, or venduing [sic] of Plunder taken from the Enemy, in
any other manner than these Orders direct, may expect to be punished in
the severest manner. '20 2 According to Washington, the property of the do-
mestic enemy was to be dealt with according to the laws of Congress and the
states. It was not the commander who had the power to decide.
This original intent evidence supports the Supreme Court's holding in
Youngstown that President Truman's order was unconstitutional. In the
majority opinion, Justice Blackman explains "The power of Congress...
can authorize the taking of private property for public use .... The Consti-
tution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or
military supervision or control."20 3 As discussed, during the American Revo-
lution, it was Congress that authorized confiscations, not Washington. Just
as it was the Continental Congress in 1777 that "Resolved, That it be ear-
nestly recommended to... confiscate and make sale of all the real and per-
sonal estate therein, of such of their inhabitants and other persons who have
forfeited the same" due to their loyalty to Britain," 4 likewise, the more
modern Congress should provide for executive seizure.205 Only once author-
ized can the commander in chief confiscate. Indeed, based upon the afore-
mentioned evidence from the Washington model, "to recall the historical
events.., would but confirm [the Court's] holding that this seizure order
cannot stand.
20 6
Washington's actions depict a strong standard of respect for the rights
of American citizens. While Washington had tremendous powers in dealing
with enemy combatants, he was extremely conscious of his limitations in
impinging upon the rights of fellow citizens.20 7 Whether the matter involved
trials or property, Washington was steadfast in his convictions regarding the
limits of his commander-in-chief powers. This understanding was commu-
nicated to the Continental Congress on numerous occasions and eventually
incorporated into the text of the Constitution. Therefore, original intent
evidence suggests that President Bush lacks the power to seize or convert a
U.S. citizen's private property under the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
202. Id.
203. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952).
204. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Nov. 27, 1777), supra
note 58, at 971.
205. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597 (stating that indeed it is "Congress [that] has...
frequently specifically provided for executive seizure").
206. Id. at 589.
207. For further discussion of Washington's refusal to confiscate property or
suspend habeas corpus, see BRUCE CHADWICK, GEORGE WASHINGTON'S WAR
227-30 (2002).
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CONCLUSION
Professor Gordon Wood noted that he could "make little or no sense of
the various institutional or other devices written into the constitution" until
he understood "the assumptions from which the constitution-makers
acted."2 8 George Washington's actions and writings throughout the Revo-
lutionary War reveal much about the original understanding of the Com-
mander-in-Chief Clause. With the Revolution, the Founding Fathers were
establishing a new and radical republic. They consciously sought to break
away from not only British dominance but also the entire monarchical sys-
tem. In doing so, however, they needed to develop their own alternative. In
forming their understanding of the commander in chief, the Continental
Congress experimented with the only commander in chief the United States
ever had.
Based upon its failed attempts to manage the Revolution by committee,
the Continental Congress granted its commander increasing power and
deference as the necessities arose. Principled and ever aware that his actions
were setting historic precedents for the new nation, Washington was ex-
ceedingly careful to only exercise those powers understood to be properly
allocated to him. He commenced the war with few powers. They were
broadened, however, as the Founding Fathers learned what their com-
mander needed in order to effectively wage the war. Specifically, these pow-
ers expanded most greatly with regard to Washington's autonomy in deter-
mining battle tactics and strategy as well as his treatment of foreign enemies.
Notably, however, Washington understood his powers to remain rather
constrained with regard to Americans.
With Washington presiding as President of the Convention, the Consti-
tutional Convention determined to grant the powers inherent in this tried
and tested concept of "commander in chief' to the President of the United
States. This study utilizes the Washington model in order to better under-
stand the implications of the Framers' original intent. As modern Presidents
invoke their commander-in-chief powers, the original understanding of the
phrase is widely recognized as at least a starting point for determining the
legitimacy of certain executive action. This Note has determined a striking
dichotomy between the commander in chiefs powers over foreign enemies
and Americans. Its conclusions suggest original intent evidence for granting
broad discretion to President Bush regarding war strategy and Congres-
sional consultation. At the same time, purely analyzing the original intent of
commander-in-chief powers and not other elements of executive authority,
this Note finds historical evidence for President Bush possessing diminished
powers in his domestic action. When it comes to Americans, it was the firm
belief of Washington, as well as the understanding of the Framers, that the
208. WOOD, supra note 27, at viii.
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commander was obliged to defer to the legislative bodies and civil courts. In
these ways, the Washington model provides original intent justification for
thirty-three years of presidential disregard of certain provisions of the War
Powers Resolution, as well as the Supreme Court's holdings in Padilla and
Youngstown.
This Note views contentious contemporary issues through a specific yet
significant lens. Examining the war powers of the first Commander in Chief
yields originalist support for certain presidential powers, rights, and obliga-
tions based upon Washington's actions during the Revolutionary War.
Harnessing this originalist approach, this Note advances present scholarship
on presidential war powers by grounding its insights into modern debate in
the historical background of the original intent of the Commander-in-Chief
Clause.
